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Modern slavery is one of the most extreme forms of labor 
abuse in the global economy. Defined as “situations of 
exploitation that a person cannot refuse or leave because of 
threats, violence, coercion, deception, and/or abuse 
of power,” tens of millions of people are estimated to be in 
modern slavery every year (International Labour Office & 
Walk Free Foundation, 2017). As such, it has become one of 
the defining grand challenges of our time. In a business con-
text, modern slavery usually manifests as human trafficking, 
debt bondage, and forced labor, all of which have been 
legally prohibited in most countries in the world for 
decades—and in many cases for nearly two centuries—in 
light of the considerable suffering and unfreedom inherent in 
these forms of labour exploitation.1
Despite such proscriptions, modern slavery flourishes. 
Take the example of the Thai fishing industry, where for 
years large numbers of men have been forced under threat of 
violence to work for no pay in the production of seafood des-
tined for retailers such as Costco, Walmart, Tesco, and 
Carrefour (Hodal et al., 2014; Lawrence & Hodal, 2017). Or 
consider the Malaysian electronics industry, where forced 
labor has been revealed to be “systematic,” with more than a 
third of migrant workers experiencing debt bondage and the 
confiscation of their passports to prevent them from leaving 
their employment (Kelly, 2014). Indeed, forced labor has 
been identified in an array of industries and countries rang-
ing from coltan mining in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo to cocoa farming in Côte d’Ivoire to construction in 
Qatar (Verité, 2017). Irrespective of widespread agreement 
that slavery should have no place in our society—as demon-
strated by various national and international laws as well as 
transnational agreements including the UN Declaration of 
Human Rights and the 1930 ILO Forced Labor Convention—
it seems to be present almost everywhere.
The prevalence of such extreme forms of exploitation has 
prompted an emerging stream of research on the business of 
modern slavery, covering such issues as the role of supply 
chain management practices in contributing to modern slav-
ery, the social responsibility strategies that firms might 
deploy to tackle modern slavery, the role of consumers in 
influencing company responses, and the effectiveness of 
regulation in changing corporate behaviour (Caruana et al., 
2021). These studies primarily focus on the role of big brands 
in taking responsibility for and addressing modern slavery in 
their supply chains, particularly in the context of anti-slavery 
regulation requiring greater supply chain transparency 
among firms, including the California Transparency in 
Supply Chains Act, 2010 and the UK Modern Slavery Act, 
2015 (e.g., Birkey et al., 2018; LeBaron & Rühmkorf, 2017; 
Stevenson & Cole, 2018).
In contrast, there has been very limited attention paid to 
the firms in those supply chains actually engaged in modern 
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slavery—that is, organizations directly involved in perpetrat-
ing slavery (Phung, 2018). Although some research has made 
important first steps in indentifying the competences required 
by such firms to exploit institutional conditions giving rise to 
modern slavery (Crane, 2013), “we know remarkably little 
about the business and organisational dynamics of forced 
labor, including how and why it is deployed as part of a busi-
ness model” (LeBaron & Crane, 2019, p. 26). Indeed, there 
has been scant research on the creation of business models to 
practice modern slavery beyond rather superficial, and 
widely critiqued, accounts in the popular press.2 However, 
confronting these business models is important because if 
companies, governments, and nongovernment organizations 
are seeking to identify, reduce, and eradicate modern slavery, 
they will need to understand how it operates in terms of its 
business models to develop effective interventions. 
Combatting modern slavery requires a better knowledge of 
how and why it flourishes in business and how such knowl-
edge can be leveraged to impede the operation of enterprises 
using such practices in the context of the broader political 
economy dynamics that give rise to severe labor exploitation 
in the global capitalist economy (LeBaron, 2020).
Yet, our ability to combat modern slavery will be limited 
without a robust understanding of how businesses deploying 
slavery in contemporary society have evolved over time, and 
especially, how business models have evolved since slavery 
was widely abolished and rendered illegal. In contrast to 
modern slavery, the business of traditional slavery has been 
extensively researched (e.g., Ransom & Sutch, 1977; Ruef, 
2014; Schermerhorn, 2015; Williams, 1944). While much 
has been written about the differences and similarities 
between traditional and modern forms of slavery (e.g., Bales, 
2004; Quirk, 2006), this scholarship has yet to specifically 
address business models. The business models of modern 
slavery, though, might be expected to deviate quite substan-
tially from those used in traditional slavery. Not only has 
business itself been transformed since that time, but slavery 
is also now an illegal practice that can cause reputational 
damage and negative attention for business. While the UN 
has estimated that modern slavery is “a $150bn-a-year busi-
ness” (International Labour Office, 2014), it is unclear what 
type of business it is, how it generates such profitability, and 
how—from a business point of view—it has evolved from 
more traditional forms of slavery. Assumptions that the strat-
egies underlying modern slavery are either similar or differ-
ent to those of traditional slavery are not helpful for designing 
interventions unless based on sound research and analysis. 
Accordingly, in this study we ask the following: How can we 
understand the contemporary business models of modern 
slavery, and what novel distinctions have emerged in relation 
to the business models of traditional slavery that need to be 
understood and disrupted?
We explore this question through an inductive case study of 
modern slavery across three sectors (cannabis, construction, 
and food) in the United Kingdom, focusing on what we term 
“modern slavery enterprises”—that is, organizations, or in 
some cases even individuals, that are directly involved in 
perpetrating modern slavery, which are typically small or 
medium sized, and are often informal or criminal enter-
prises, rather than mainstream companies. We focus on 
modern slavery enterprises in the United Kingdom engaged 
in modern slavery practices within the country. We ground 
our comparative analysis in the business models that pre-
vailed in the 19th-century Antebellum US South (Johnson, 
2013, Miller & Smith, 1997; Rosenthal, 2018), since these 
are widely viewed as emblematic of traditional slavery. 
Although UK companies also used slavery in the 19th cen-
tury (Smith & Johns 2019) and would also make for a sound 
reference point, we opted to ground our comparison in the 
business models of slavery plantations physically located in 
the United States (irrespective of the nationality of their 
owners) since—as we discuss further—this context (the 
19th-century Antebellum US South) is commonly invoked 
and used as a basis for comparison between “traditional” 
and “modern” slavery within contemporary social science 
scholarship (Azmy 2002; Bales, 2004), and is frequently (if 
not accurately) depicted as the “typical” instantiation of 
slavery (Pargas, 2016).
Our findings reveal that the business models of modern 
slavery can be best understood in terms of two dimensions: 
whether the slavery enterprise is a producer or intermediary, 
and whether it captures value through revenue-generation or 
cost-reduction activities. Moreover, our dissection of busi-
ness models along these dimensions reveals four business 
models of modern slavery that are distinctly novel in com-
parison to the business of traditional slavery: risk reduction, 
asset leveraging, evading legal minimums, and workers as 
consumers. Ultimately, we show that while continuities 
from the business models of traditional slavery persist in 
contemporary society, key divergences in the business mod-
els of slavery have emerged as part of the evolution of slav-
ery into present times.
In identifying and dissecting the novel business models of 
modern slavery, we confront and and bring clarity to the 
vagueness surrounding the businesses often situated at the 
bottom of supply chains and in the shadows of the economy 
that actually perpetrate modern slavery, thereby addressing a 
frequently neglected part of the modern slavery puzzle and 
literature (e.g., LeBaron & Crane, 2019; Phung & Crane, 
2018). In addition, by framing our analysis of these changes 
in terms of business model innovation (e.g., Amit & Zott, 
2012; Osterwalder & Pigneur, 2010; Teece, 2010), we con-
tribute a novel dark side analysis to this literature, offering 
stark examples of and pathways for negative business model 
innovations anchored in oppression and exclusion (Martí, 
2018). Finally, we reveal how understanding the novel dis-
tinctions of the business models of modern slavery can 
inform policy makers and practitioners in their efforts to 
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design interventions to combat modern slavery, recognizing 
the essential role of governments in either facilitating or 
helping to eradicate modern slavery and in developing effec-
tive ways to rid supply chains of labor exploitation (e.g., 
Crane et al., 2019; LeBaron, 2020).
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. First, we 
explore the business of traditional slavery and locate these 
practices within a theoretical framing of business models. 
Next, we specify our research questions and methods, detail-
ing our empirical study of modern slavery in the United 
Kingdom. Then, in our findings, we present a typology of 
novel business models before finally discussing the implica-
tions of our analysis for theory, practice, and the design of 
effective interventions.
The Business of Traditional Slavery
Today, slavery is considered an “obvious wrong” (Quirk, 
2008), but insofar as this is true now, it has not always been 
the case. Traditional slavery (i.e., that which took place 
prior to its legal abolition across the 19th century) covered 
many forms and contexts but was largely accepted (or at 
least tolerated) as a necessary social and economic institu-
tion that was protected in law and custom. Historical 
research has documented variations in how such traditional 
slavery operated as a business across periods and regions 
(Black 2011; Quirk & LeBaron, 2015; Sinha, 2016). Without 
discounting the differences that characterized slavery prior 
to its abolition, we use slavery in the Antebellum South as a 
key reference point for comparison because (a) it has been 
subjected to the most comprehensive economic analysis to 
date with respect to the business of slavery; (b) it is the most 
common reference point within the literature on modern 
slavery (e.g. Bales, 2004); and (c) it represents a similar 
basis for comparison for our empirical material that relates 
to an advanced capitalist country, particularly given that 
national setting is far less relevant to our interest in this 
paper than business type and dynamics. Indeed, while our 
contemporary empirical focus is on modern slavery that 
takes place in the United Kingdom and traditional slavery 
that took place in the Antebellum US South, historians have 
shown that UK companies were also heavily involved in 
slavery in the United States during this period (both before 
and after independence) and that US slavery was very much 
a joint Anglo-American effort supported by the British 
empire (Beckert, 2015; Boodry, 2016).
While there has been much debate about the economic 
rationality or otherwise of slavery (Adam Smith, 1981, for 
example, argued that slavery was economically inefficient 
and was motivated by “love of domination”), it is by now 
widely accepted that despite what we might now think about 
the ethical unacceptability of slavery, plantation owners in 
the Antebellum South, “like profit-maximizing business-
men.. chose the most profitable investments available” 
(Miller & Smith, 1997, p. 595). According to Stampp (1956, 
p. 85), “slavery in the South was the most productive and 
profitable mode of production of this era” as slaves worked 
year-round and compensated for price declines. Planters 
could extract more labor hours per worker per year than in 
the North (Anderson & Gallman, 1977; Wilson, 1996). 
Defining efficiency as the ratio of output to the average 
input, Fogel and Engerman (1974, p. 192) found that “south-
ern slave farms were 28 percent more efficient that southern 
free farms. . .[and] compared with northern farms. . .slave 
farms were 40 percent more efficient.” This is not to suggest 
that the labor of enslaved people was a mechanical input; 
indeed, as historians like Walter Johnson have extensively 
argued, “while it is easy to lose sight of the elementally 
human character of labor—even that of forced labor—in 
light of the salutary political effect of labelling slavery ‘inhu-
man’,” the enslaved exhibited agency within these business 
models, defining and redefining labor processes, even as 
they were subjected to violent physical punishment, coer-
cion, and pain (Johnson, 2013, p. 9).
Thus, scholars have shown that planters used slavery 
because, notwithstanding any moral considerations, they 
recognized that certain crops could be profitable when pro-
duced to scale and that slave labor was reliable, allowed 
for more control, and was more productive than free labor 
(Clark, 2012; Klein, 2007; Morgan, 1975; Williams, 1944). 
As Williams (1944, p. 19) notes, “the cheapness of the 
labor” made slavery the economically superior option. For 
example, Wilson (1996, p.71) shows that a planter who 
invested $300,000 for 300 slaves, “earns back this initial 
investment in 4 years and continues to accumulate more 
than $79,000 annually in labor cost savings.” Having 
established, albeit quite briefly, that antebellum US slav-
ery was motivated by profit and that antebellum planta-
tions functioned as profit-maximizing firms, we now turn 
to its underlying business model.
Business Models and their Application to 
Traditional Slavery
The business model is central to contemporary thinking 
about commercial enterprises, and it has spawned a vast 
body of academic literature that represents an important 
extension to the traditional strategy literature in management 
(Massa et al., 2017). While the business model continues to 
suffer from a lack of definitional and conceptual clarity 
(Demil et al., 2015; Zott et al., 2011), “[a]t a very general and 
intuitive level, a business model is a description of an orga-
nization and how that organization functions in achieving its 
goals (e.g., profitability, growth, social impact)” (Massa 
et al., 2017, p. 73, italics in original). The business model is 
also commonly regarded as a unit of analysis, a system-level 
concept centered on activities and focusing on value (Zott 
et al., 2011), and it has been increasingly applied to the study 
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of environmental and social issues, including oppression 
(Martí, 2018), as well as how businesses respond to a chang-
ing societal landscape.
We view a business model as “the rationale of how an 
organization creates, delivers, and captures value” 
(Osterwalder & Pigneur, 2010, p.14). In turn, it concerns the 
specification of the organizational resources, revenue 
streams, and cost structures that give rise to profitability. Put 
simply, “a good business model answers. . .the fundamental 
questions every manager must ask: How do we make money 
in this business? What is the underlying economic logic that 
explains how we can deliver value to customers at an appro-
priate cost?” (Magretta, 2002, p.4).
The way that researchers of business models conceptual-
ize transitions and evolutions in business models is through 
the lens of “business model innovation,” which by exten-
sion to the definition of a business model represents a new 
way of aligning resources, revenues, costs, and value to 
make money. According to Amit and Zott (2012), business 
model innovation can involve adding new activities, link-
ing activities in new ways, or changing which actor per-
forms an activity. Such innovations can create new markets, 
exploit new opportunities, reshape industries, generate and 
capture new value, create barriers to entry, adapt to changes, 
and offer competitive advantages, but they do not come 
easily and they often require trial and error, experimenta-
tion, and patience (Amit & Zott, 2012; Chesbrough, 2007, 
2010; Johnson et al., 2008; Osterwalder & Pigneur, 2010; 
Teece, 2010). To date, business model innovation has been 
almost entirely framed as a positive development that 
enables companies to create value in new ways. However, 
in using the concept in the context of slavery, we want to 
highlight that evolutions of business models are far from 
always positive and that they can also have profoundly neg-
ative societal effects and entail considerable harm and 
abuse for workers.
Returning to slavery in the Antebellum South, we can 
make a case, distasteful as it might be, that Southern planta-
tions that used slave labor relied on specific business models 
and that these business models were in some respects an 
“innovation” on the business models of plantations that used 
free labor. Of course, this business “innovation” involved 
far more severe forms of labor discipline and the imposition 
of greater levels of unfreedom than were generally present 
among businesses who relied on so-called free waged labor 
and was therefore more just an increase in brutality and ter-
ror from labor’s point of view. Likewise, we will argue that 
business models of modern slavery are distinctively novel 
when compared to antebellum slavery, representing highly 
negative transformations that enable businesses to continue 
to profit from slavery despite its illegality. In this, we are 
following Martí (2018) in examining the dark side of busi-
ness model innovation, where rather than only being con-
cerned with social or economic progress, we can also 
examine how new business models can contribute to oppres-
sion and exclusion.
According to Amit and Zott’s model (2012), we suggest 
that slavery plantations changed their business models by 
changing who performed key value creating activities since 
they relied on enslaved labor rather than waged labor. 
Enslaved labor created an advantageous cost structure, con-
verting a variable cost to an upfront fixed cost with a mod-
est payback (Anderson & Gallman, 1977; Metzer, 1975). 
Planters could extract more work from enslaved laborers, 
which enabled them to produce to scale, diversify their 
crops, internalize services, and become self-sufficient. 
Thus, they minimized their costs, improved profits, and 
often generated more revenue. Plantations using enslaved 
labor also created relationships with key partners such as 
slave traders, and they continued to persist because it was 
supported by government policy. Therefore, changes in one 
area (i.e., who performed activities) enabled other business 
model changes. For instance, it facilitated vertical integra-
tion to internalize services that would have been contracted 
out to free labor. While a full analysis of the business mod-
els of traditional slavery is beyond our scope, it is clear that 
slavery changed the business model of the Southern planta-
tion in ways that facilitated business profit as well as high 
levels of human suffering.
Despite the economic advantages of the slavery busi-
ness model, it eventually was dismantled by a decades-
long anti-slavery movement, which included successful 
attempts to undermine the business model of slavery, 
including consumer boycotts in the United Kingdom that 
targeted slave made imports (Smith & Johns, 2019). As 
Quirk (2006, p. 584) argues, this was a “remarkable 
achievement. . .against an enduring, valuable and histori-
cally entrenched institution. The outcome of this confron-
tation was by no means inevitable. The obstacles involved 
were substantial, the costs entailed considerable, yet slav-
ery was gradually stripped of legal standing.” The argu-
ments against slavery, which seem so taken for granted 
now, revolved around the injustices of ownership of other 
human beings, and extreme exploitation (Quirk 2006). 
However, following the legal abolition of slavery, which 
was enacted in the United Kingdom in 1833 and in the 
United States in 1865, these problems did not cease entirely 
but continued in a variety of forms and designations 
(Quirk, 2008), including in mining (Evans, 2013) and 
cocoa farming (Satre, 2005). Today, the term “modern 
slavery” is used to refer to some of the most extreme forms 
of exploitation that have some degree of equivalence to 
traditional slavery, albeit without the legal status that slav-
ery once enjoyed. Thus, our guiding research question is: 
how can we now understand the business models of mod-
ern slavery in relation to those of traditional slavery, and 
what novel distinctions have emerged that need to be 
understood and disrupted?
Crane et al. 5
Methods
Research Context and Design
To explore this question, we conducted a qualitative case 
study of modern slavery in contemporary United Kingdom. 
While a crucial step in qualitative research is finding a “the-
ory-method fit” (Gehman et al., 2018), “theory building from 
case study research is particularly appropriate” when “little 
is known about a phenomenon, current perspectives seem 
inadequate because they have little empirical substantiation, 
or they conflict with each other or common sense” (Eisenhardt 
1989, p. 548). For modern slavery, “not only does the field 
lack a deep theoretical understanding on modern slavery, but 
it also suffers from deficiencies in terms of its empirical 
understanding at the organizational level and of the overall 
business side” (Phung & Crane, 2018, p. 180).
Modern slavery is an umbrella term that covers a wide 
range of practices, including forced labor, forced marriage, 
domestic slavery, child soldiers, forced prostitution, and 
human trafficking, and it occurs in a variety of contexts. For 
empirical precision, we focused specifically on forced labor 
imposed by private actors for the purposes of labor exploita-
tion since this was most relevant to our research question. 
We also focused on the context of the United Kingdom 
because selecting a developed country that had abolished and 
criminalized the practice of slavery enabled us to focus on 
specifically modern forms. Further, the fact that the United 
Kingdom has been at the forefront of government efforts to 
combat modern slavery makes it an ideal context in which to 
explore how businesses have managed to evade laws ban-
ning the use of severe labor exploitation. We do not claim to 
be exhaustive in our study of modern slavery, and caution 
should be made when generalizing beyond the sectors and 
context that comprise the focus of our study.
In empirically operationalizing the umbrella concept of 
modern slavery in terms of the more specific practice of 
forced labor, we applied the internationally recognized defi-
nition of forced labor from the International Labour 
Organisation Forced Labour Convention.3 Thus, we consid-
ered someone as being in forced labor when their work was 
involuntary because of force, fraud or deception, and a pen-
alty or threat of a penalty being used to coerce them (for a 
longer discussion of operationalizing the ILO definition of 
forced labor for social science research see LeBaron, 2018). 
We also concentrated on two legal business sectors (food and 
construction) and one illegal business sector (cannabis culti-
vation) to explore different business models across formal, 
informal, and criminal modern slavery enterprises.
Data and Analysis
To explore the business side of modern slavery in our three 
focus sectors in the United Kingdom, we collected data from 
two main sources: (a) archival data and (b) interviews. We 
drew on archival data because forced labor in the United 
Kingdom had experienced notable attention in the public and 
scholarly domains, and we knew also that there was existing 
and detailed court documentation that we could draw on. Our 
archival data consisted of a total of 62 court documents and 
appeal cases, 35 newspaper articles, 42 academic studies, 
and 63 reports that offered detailed insight into well-docu-
mented cases in our three sectors.
We conducted 33 semi-structured interviews with key 
informants in the field (Table 1). Evidently, due to the sensi-
tivity of the issue, collecting primary data on perpetrators of 
modern slavery presents grave challenges (Stringer & 
Simmons, 2015) and has hindered the ability of researchers 
to understand the business side of modern slavery (LeBaron 
& Crane, 2019). However, when collecting data directly 
from the source (i.e., perpetrators of modern slavery) is not 
an option, adopting a stakeholder-oriented approach with 
informants knowledgeable about such practices, but not 
directly involved in conducting them, can be an effective 
way to piece together the puzzle (Phung & Crane, 2018). 
Thus, we conducted interviews with experts on forced labor, 
law enforcement agents, governmental and non-governmen-
tal organization (NGO) representatives, researchers, journal-
ists, lawyers, employer representatives, company executives, 
consultants, social auditors, and trade union representatives, 
all with knowledge of at least one of our sectors and often 
more. All interviews were audio-recorded and transcribed 
for analysis.
We acknowledge that our approach limits, to some extent, 
our ability to give direct voice to the victims of modern slav-
ery. Conducting on the ground research with workers them-
selves is important since no matter how exploited, workers 
always have agency and a perspective on their conditions 
and can be a valuable source of information about the busi-
ness dynamics of modern slavery (LeBaron, 2018, 2020; 
LeBaron & Crane, 2019). However, this type of research is 
challenging and resource-intensive to conduct ethically and, 
although we have undertaken extensive research with work-
ers in other settings and believe it is important to give voice 
to those confronting labour exploitation within research on 
the topic where it is possible to do this well, it was not fea-
sible to integrate into our research design for this particular 
project. We have therefore sought to interview actors who 
have extensive direct contact with victims and to draw on 
sources that give voice to victims to shine light on their lived 
experiences. For example, the report by Elliot and Lucio 
(2011) in our database is “primarily a collation of individual 
stories that seeks to capture something of the day-to-day 
experience of vulnerable workers in construction,” while that 
of Kagan et al (2011) adopted a life-story interview method 
with migrant workers.
These kinds of “modern slave narratives” are important in 
making modern slavery visible and legible, giving voice to 
the variety of experiences of enslavement and exploitation, 
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and articulating potential solutions from the point of view of 
those affected (Johnson, 2013; Murphy, 2015). Drawing 
from our data, we showcase vignettes and extended quotes 
from reports and other sources to give a stronger flavor of the 
victim experience of modern slavery business models. 
Nevertheless, these accounts remain framed and re-presented 
by us, as well as other researchers, in order to help tell our 
specific interpretation of their stories. As such, we have 
sought to avoid common problems in third-person represen-
tations of the experiences of modern slavery victims such as 
“mak[ing] a spectacle of the enslaved body” (Murphy 2015, 
p. 394) and reducing the variety of experience to a prototypi-
cal slavery “script” (Johnson, 2013).
Our analysis followed the commonly prescribed approach 
to coding data, in which we iteratively developed multiple 
levels of codes (Miles & Huberman, 1994). Specifically, our 
analysis involved three levels of coding: (a) initial coding, 
where empirical themes that emerged from the interviews 
were linked with those extracted from the secondary data in 
relation to the components of business models derived from 
the literature, such as “price of service”, “labour cost”, 
“profit”, etc; (b) categorical coding, where initial codes were 
refined and examined to determine specific manifestations of 
these components in a business model, such as “value cre-
ation”, “value capture”, “cost reduction”; “revenue genera-
tion”, etc; and (c) thematic coding, where themes were 
identified from the refined data and compared with the litera-
ture to develop our business models and their dimensions. 
We then convened a round-table discussion with eight 
experts in the field to refine and validate our interpretations. 
The process of analysis was iterative but not linear. That is, 
we moved constantly between data and interpretation, refin-
ing codes as we progressed, adjusting our theoretical frame-
work as new insights emerged, and repeatedly returning to 
our data to investigate interesting avenues for further explo-
ration. We also sought not to abstract our analysis of business 
Table 1. Overview of Interviews.
Position Industries Discussed
Director, NGO Food, construction, cannabis
CEO, NGO Cannabis, food, construction
Communications officer, Trade union Food, construction
Director, Public body Food
President, Corporation Construction
Director, Trade association Food
Executive, Social audit firm Food, construction
Head of advocacy, NGO Cannabis
Sustainability manager, Audit firm Food, construction
Director, Consulting firm Cannabis, food, construction
Journalist & consultant Food, construction
Executive director, NGO Food, construction, cannabis
Director, NGO Cannabis
Senior manager, Law enforcement Cannabis
Director, Multi-stakeholder initiative Food
Regional Officer, Trade union Food, construction
Drugs strategy manager, Law enforcement Cannabis
Director, Social audit firm Food, construction
Policy officer, Trade union Construction
Drugs expert, Law enforcement Cannabis
Chief executive officer, NGO Cannabis, food
Associate professor, University Cannabis
Sector manager, Risk management firm Construction
Vice president, Non-profit organization Food, construction
Criminal intelligence analyst, Law enforcement Cannabis
Chief executive, Public body Food
Manager, NGO Food, construction
Manager, Recruitment company Construction
Manager, NGO Food, construction
CSR team, food retailer Food
Manager, Recruitment company Food
Professor, University Food, construction, cannabis
Manager, Consulting firm Food
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models too far from the embodied experiences of enslave-
ment by victims, so our analytical categories remained teth-
ered to specific cases and vignettes throughout the analytical 
process. We continued in this way until we had developed a 
logically consistent and theoretically sound interpretation 
that was consistent with our data.
Findings
While traditional slavery gave rise to a relatively simple 
and stable business model supported by institutions, mod-
ern slavery has encompassed a variety of business models 
with different degrees of complexity. We first outline a 
framework that parsimoniously captures the essential con-
tours of the business models of modern slavery. Then, we 
discuss how these differ from those that characterize tradi-
tional forms of slavery.
Confronting the Business Models of Modern 
Slavery
Our analysis suggests that the business models of modern 
slavery can be best captured with respect to two key dimen-
sions: (a) which actor is directly capturing value from mod-
ern slavery (i.e., the modern slavery enterprise), which we 
distinguish between producers and intermediaries; and (b) 
through which activities or combinations of activities do 
actors create or capture value, which we distinguish between 
revenue generation and cost reduction activities. Thus, 
while it entails abhorrent living and working conditions for 
labor, modern slavery can improve an enterprise’s profit for-
mula through its cost structure, revenue stream, or both 
(Johnson et al., 2008; Osterwalder & Pigneur, 2010). 
Combining these dimensions, we identify and dissect four 
business models of modern slavery that possess key distinc-
tions in comparison to traditional slavery: risk reduction, 
asset leveraging, evading legal minimums, and workers as 
consumers (see Figure 1).
Although we have discussed the two dimensions of the 
framework in Figure 1 in terms of two main forms (producer-
intermediary and cost minimization-revenue generation), 
different business models and the employment relationships 
they describe are likely to exhibit different degrees along 
these dimensions. For instance, some employment relation-
ships will have greater degrees of intermediation than others 
(e.g., when multiple intermediaries are involved). Similarly, 
some business models will exhibit a higher degree of reve-
nue generation. As such, we have represented them as conti-
nua with axes pointing outwards and not discrete categories.
Each of these business models comes in different forms 
and they vary in terms of the nature of perpetrators, vic-
tims, value practices (i.e. practices deployed to create or 
capture economic value) that give rise to exploitation, and 
the focus of their modern slavery business model. While 
these variations are summarized in Table 2 and discussed 
in detail further, we also offer illustrative vignettes of vic-
tims of the identified modern slavery business models in 
Table 3 to illuminate the lived experiences of victims and 
humanize our study.
Risk Reduction Model
In a risk reduction model, the deployment of modern slavery 
serves to reduce the risk that a perpetrator’s illegal enterprise 
Figure 1. New business models of modern slavery.
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Table 2. Elements of Modern Slavery Business Models.
Modern Slavery Business Models Perpetrator Victim
Value Practices that Give Rise to 
Exploitation
Focus of Modern Slavery 
Business Model
Risk reduction Illegal labor 
practices
Producer in legal industry, 
subject to external 
oversight due to 
geographic location or 
supply chain position.
Vulnerable workers, 
usually with poor 
skills, language, and 
understanding, plus 
mistrust of authorities.
Use of coercion to force workers 
to hide value capturing practices.
Reducing costs by 
reducing risks of 
illegality.
Illegal markets Producer in illegal industry, 
usually organized criminal 
gang.
Trafficked workers, 
usually of same national 
origin as perpetrator.
Use of coercion and physical 
restraints to force workers to 
hide value creating practices.
Reducing costs by 
reducing risks of 
illegality.
Asset leveraging Leveraging 
organization’s 
assets
Producer in legal industry 
with low potential for value 
capture within the supply 
chain from production.
Vulnerable workers, 
especially those with 
little capital and/or in 
debt.
Sale of ancillary services at 
excessive prices to increase 
control and avoid value 
distribution to workers.
Generating additional 
revenue from activities 
related to core business 
to recoup labor costs.
Leveraging 
workers’ assets
Producer in legal/illegal 
industry, sometimes 
informal business, with low 
potential for value capture 
from production.
Vulnerable workers, 
usually resident within 
the relevant local 
welfare regime.
Use of coercion to extract value 
from victim’s assets.
Generating additional 
revenue from activities 







Informal labor intermediary, 




recruited in home 
country.
Create value for producers and 
other intermediaries by offering 
low-cost labor provision that 
avoids statutory labor standards.
Reducing labor costs 












Create value for producers and 
other intermediaries by offering 
low-cost labor provision that 
avoids statutory labor standards.
Reducing labor costs 
through regulatory 
avoidance.
Workers as consumers Formal or informal labor 
intermediary, with low 




Capture value from sale of 
ancillary services at high prices 
to maximize revenue per 
worker.
Generating revenue by 
exploiting control over 
indebted workers.
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Table 3. Vignettes of Victims of Modern Slavery Business Models.
Risk reduction
Vignette from the cannabis industry (Kelley, 2019)
Minh was a 16-year-old boy from Vietnam born into poverty who was deceived by his “friends” and “kidnapped, raped and trafficked to the UK, and 
then locked up and forced to grow cannabis” and “when the police found him, he was treated like a criminal rather than a victim.” The men who 
trafficked him once showed him a “paper that said he owed them £20,000 for his passage to Europe, [and] he was so terrified that he signed it.” 
They also told him “they knew where his parents lived.” Like the “hundreds of children trafficked from Vietnam every year and forced to work 
in hidden cannabis farms across the UK” Minh was deemed “valuable” by criminal organizations in cannabis market as he is considered “cheap, 
expendable, and easy to control and intimidate” in “makeshift cannabis farms in suburban houses, empty flats, deserted warehouses and derelict 
industrial estates.” Minh spent his days afraid, alone, and locked in a dark room and was given frozen meat to heat up with a microwave. One day he 
tried to escape but was caught, brought back, and told that “he’d be killed if he tried to escape again.” As this account shows, Minh’s experience was 
traumatizing and did not end at the cannabis farm as he was convicted of cannabis production and sentenced to eight months in a young offenders’ 
institution and then moved to an immigration removal center where he was sexually assaulted:
   “I was very, very scared of these men [the police]. . . . But then I let myself believe that maybe they had come to rescue me. . . . They didn’t ask, 
so I didn’t say anything, I didn’t know I was allowed. . . . It was like another kind of world. . . I didn’t really even feel human. I understood very 
quickly that the plants were more valuable than my life. . . . It just felt like my life was over [after the sexual assault]. I just understood that I was 
not safe anywhere. . .  I was very scared of the other inmates and that something like this would happen again. I knew I couldn’t trust the staff 
there to protect me. . . . After the incident . . . it was like I had split into two different people. . . . I don’t know who I am any more, but maybe 
there is a way to build a life for myself again . . . Since I left detention I have always felt scared, especially when I thought about how I was trying to 
fight the police and the Home Office. . . . But I have to try my best to get justice, to take back my life. I have to trust that things can be better.”
Asset leveraging
Vignette from the construction industry (UCATT, 2009)
Dozens of Lithuanian migrant workers were working on a government hospital construction site in the United Kingdom worth £600 million. The 
site is managed by a major construction firm, Skanska, who subcontracted to major subcontractors, including a firm called Baris, who subsequently 
subcontracted to a small dry lining company called Produm, which was the employer of the Lithuanian workers. According to the Union of 
Construction Allied Trades and Technicians (UCATT), these Lithuanian workers were victims of “a case of appalling systematic abuse of vulnerable 
migrant workers” by Produm at the hospital construction site. While little to no publicly available first-hand accounts from the workers exist, the 
following account from UCATT, who unearthed the case and reported it to authorities, reveals that the workers were exploited by their employer 
Produm, who was also charging them for various assets such as accommodation and tools.
   Our officer obtained the workers’ pay slips, which revealed that some workers took home just £8.80, after working a 40-hour week. Dry lining 
subcontracting company Produm employed the dozen Lithuanian workers. The workers were paid below agreed minimum rates for the site 
operated by main contractor Skanska, they did not receive overtime (some workers worked in excess of 70 hours and took home less than £100) 
and were charged excessive deductions for rent, tools and utility bills. It is understood that many of these charges were unlawful. UCATT were only 
able to uncover the extent of the abuse after some of the workers stopped being paid altogether with the company currently owing some workers 
five weeks’ pay. The workers were initially scared of approaching the union because the company also provided their accommodation.
Evading legal minimums
Vignette from the food industry (Lawrence, 2016)
Six Lithuanian men who were promised good pay were trafficked to the United Kingdom and exploited by a gangmaster firm to catch chickens on farms, 
many of which produced eggs for major supermarkets and fast-food chains. As per a judge’s ruling “the men were owed compensation for the firm’s 
failure to pay the agricultural minimum wage, for the charging of prohibited work-finding fees, for unlawfully withholding wages, and for depriving the 
workers of facilities to wash, rest, eat and drink.” As 19-year-old Laurynas’s account indicates, being exploited by the gangmaster firm clearly evading 
legal minimums was horrific:
   “It’s easy to control people who are scared, controlling your hours, controlling your sleep, controlling your money, controlling everything that you 
have. . .. We weren’t told how many hours, how many days you need to work, nothing. We were just told you’re going to catch chickens. . .. From 
the outside, it [the accommodation] didn’t look bad, but when I got inside, I was shocked straight away. But I didn’t have the choice to go back, so 
I needed to stay. All the people were sleeping in a big bedroom on a mattress on the floor. . .. We were working eight hours on the farm, sit in the 
van, driving two hours to the next farm, working again about eight hours, sit in the van, getting back, working again, eight or six hours. . .. One of 
the supervisors beat two people, and once I was nearly beaten after I tried to help one of them get up off the floor. . . He gave me a two-day rest 
with broken ribs. . .. It’s easy to control people who are scared and don’t know where to go to look for help. . . I never thought that when I left 
Lithuania that I’d end up like that. I lost trust. I lost trust in people.”
Workers as consumers
Vignette from the food industry (Scott et al., 2012)
Three Latvian workers were recruited by a gangmaster to work in food production, but ended being underworked and trapped from indebtedness 
from payments for accommodation (i.e., caravan), transport, unexplained deductions, and borrowed money for basic services such as topping up 
their phones to call home. One of them was a mother and wife seeking to earn income to be sent back to her family in Latvia, but was unable to 
do so as they were given so little work, sometimes just one day per week, and was “ashamed” for ending up in such as position, as described in 
the following account:
   Almost two weeks without a day off, 11.5 hours per day, after all deductions we received £119. Then when it was quieter I have not received 
anything. I only got a payslip with all the deductions. I was not even earning enough to pay for accommodation! I was in debt!. . .. Caravans were 
very crowded, a lot of people, ten people lived in each caravan. . .. In the sitting room, one woman was sleeping on the floor, two of us on the 
bench, and fourth woman who did not have anywhere to sleep had to wait until everyone had something to eat and then she could move a kitchen 
table to make some sort of sleeping area. . .. It was beneficial for them to have as many people in the house as possible. The more people were 
living in the house, the more people were paying for accommodation. Workwise they would give you a little bit of work, so they could get money 
off us for accommodation. The rest was not important to them. Some people were going into fields to steal potatoes and cabbages because they 
did not have money to buy food. They did not care about that. The most important for them was to get as many people as possible.
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and/or illegal practices will be detected. Specifically, produc-
ers in formal and informal industries employ workers in their 
operations and use coercion and restrictions in workers’ free-
doms to reduce labor costs and, importantly, to protect the 
viability of the firm and its illegal practices or business activi-
ties. Yet, our analysis revealed that the risk reduction model is 
most prominent in two sometimes overlapping contexts—
enterprises using illegal labor practices within an otherwise 
legal industry and enterprises engaged in illegal industries.
Regarding enterprises using illegal labor practices, we 
found evidence across both our legal industries—food and 
construction—that modern slavery may in part serve as 
means for reducing the risk that illegal labor practices will be 
detected. However, the deployment of modern slavery as a 
risk reduction method may not necessarily arise from an 
employer’s explicit intention to engage in modern slavery 
but may at times be the result of a downward spiral in labor 
standards. That is, initial efforts to reduce the impact of labor 
costs—typically brought on by the cost pressures from buy-
ers further down the value chain—could lead employers to 
engage in borderline illegal or illegal labor practices to cap-
ture more value from workers, such as arbitrary deductions 
of pay, excessive hours, health and safety violations, or pay-
ing below the minimum wage. When employers are subject 
to some form of external oversight, due either to their geo-
graphic location or their position in the supply chain (e.g. 
they are subject to a retailer’s social audit), this creates a 
need to conceal said practices to safeguard the firm. This can 
prompt an employer to engage in further practices that pres-
ent limits to workers’ freedom, thereby exacerbating exploi-
tation until, in some cases, extreme exploitation crosses the 
line into modern slavery. At this point, the priority of employ-
ers is not only to maintain their minimal labor costs but also 
to reduce the risk that their illegal labor practices will be 
detected, creating a vicious cycle of exploitation and con-
cealment. For example, in one report, a homeless man 
describes how his employer restricted his freedom to conceal 
exploitative practices:
The work was horrible. The boss was always rushing us and 
forcing us to do jobs really badly for private customers. . .. To 
begin with he paid me £20 per day, cash in hand, plus lunch 
which was a cheap sandwich. . .. The boss was very intimidating 
and did not like us going off the site on our own. He was always 
asking where I was going and what I was doing. I had no private 
life. If I wanted to go to the local shop, he would insist on driving 
me there and back. He was threatening and would say “I’ll kill 
you” or “I’ll beat you up,” half joking but in a frightening 
way. . .. I felt like a virtual prisoner and wanted to escape from 
the situation but felt I couldn’t. I had become very lonely and 
depressed and had lost a lot of confidence. I was ashamed of 
what was happening to me. (Elliot & Lucio, 2011, p. 17)
Our analysis revealed that, in addition to coercion to force 
workers to conceal employers’ practices, employers would 
also deliberately target highly vulnerable workers to reduce 
risks. They typically target workers who are illegal immi-
grants, lack skills and a basic understanding of the local lan-
guage and norms, and come from countries where there is a 
distrust for authorities. These factors all contribute to a criti-
cal layer of opacity that impedes the detection and prosecu-
tion of exploitative value-capturing practices in businesses. 
For example, one of our social auditor informants described 
a case of a food warehouse in which a group of Romanian 
women were intentionally recruited into forced labor because 
they did not speak English well and would not have the 
power to ask questions or seek help. Thus, it is often difficult 
for workers to create social support networks, even if they 
are not confined to a site. Moreover, as one informant 
explained, negative perceptions of authorities function as a 
safeguard to reduce risks of detection:
The huge problem in trying to expose wrongdoing in this whole 
area of exploited workers is that they’re all afraid so they won’t 
come forward. Particularly as many of them are Eastern 
Europeans. . .where the authorities are the enemy and if you 
complain you’ll be beaten up. It really is like that and so they are 
terrified of authority and they don’t want to, you know they 
don’t trust the system. They don’t want to speak out because 
they’re afraid so that makes it much easier for the employers to 
exploit them. (Journalist and Consultant, Interview).
Second, we found that the risk reduction business model 
of modern slavery could be used by firms operating in infor-
mal or illegal industries to reduce the risk that their illegal 
enterprises will be detected. Specifically, illicit enterprises 
are vulnerable to the risk that their workers will engage in 
whistleblowing and report their illegal activities. Our analy-
sis indicated that modern slavery practices enable cannabis 
producers to reduce their risk of being detected, thus protect-
ing the viability of their enterprises—of course, at the 
expense of considerable hardship for workers.
The perpetrators in this model were typically reported to 
be organized criminal gangs, usually of Vietnamese or 
Chinese origin. We found that the victims would usually be 
workers of the same nationality or ethnicity as their perpe-
trators who were trafficked in from overseas. Risk reduction 
is, on the one hand, achieved via coercive means such as 
physical constraints and threats by an employer to force 
workers to hide their practices. For instance, in the case of R 
v N; R v LE (2012), the appellant, who did not speak 
English, was found to have been locked up in a cannabis 
farm with brick-covered windows and doors, guarded by 
gun-carrying security guards. He was found to be unpaid 
and was threatened with death upon attempting to escape. 
On the other hand, by bringing in illegal workers to work as 
“gardeners,” employers in cannabis production can also 
reduce the risk that their illegal activities will be discovered. 
In particular, because illegal workers possess high vulnera-
bility, and may be confined to a site, they will be unlikely to 
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report their employer’s illegal enterprises to the authorities, 
thus reducing risks. This is particularly the case for children 
in situations of forced labor because even if they are caught, 
they are unlikely to be prosecuted, thereby further reducing 
risk as explained by this informant:
There has been probably an increasing trend to use younger 
people. . .. I think maybe they perceive that there’s maybe less 
risk with children, children will then not be prosecuted, not go 
into the criminal system and may not say anything because 
they’re not being prosecuted and they may not identify who the 
traffickers are. But whatever model they use it will be to 
minimise the risk to those who are ultimately responsible. 
(Director, Consulting Firm, Interview)
The risk reduction model possesses a key distinction in 
comparison to traditional slavery business models in that 
new linkages are formed between restrictions on freedom 
and value creation and capture. Rather than such restrictions 
being solely about labor cost reductions, they also improve 
the effectiveness of, and reduce the costs of, concealment of 
illegal value creating or capturing practices by businesses.
Asset Leveraging
In an asset leveraging model, a producer’s use of modern 
slavery entails new activities that leverage existing assets to 
generate additional revenue streams. However, it is important 
to note that revenue generation co-exists with cost minimiza-
tion, and the two components are not easily disentangled from 
each other. Nonetheless, our analysis indicates that revenue 
generation is often achieved by charging workers for ancil-
lary services, and is more commonly found in contexts where 
profitability, or the potential to capture value from the core 
business activity, is relatively low—again, often as a result of 
value capture from firms further along the supply chain.
For instance, in farming, the economic logic in many 
developed countries is that small operations struggle to sur-
vive in the face of consolidation, which creates larger and 
more powerful competitors that can reap economies of scale. 
Food processors and retailers are also mainly large players 
that can dictate prices through the supply chain, which leaves 
farmers at the bottom of the supply chain with narrow mar-
gins. Typically, small farmers running legitimate businesses 
will look to capitalize on their assets by expanding their port-
folio of operations and engaging in creative diversification 
into value-adding processes such as packaging, tourism (e.g., 
operating tours or a bed and breakfast), retail (e.g., selling at 
a farm or farmers’ markets), or energy generation (Morris 
et al., 2017). However, small farmers using forced labor will 
leverage assets in two ways: (a) leveraging the organization’s 
assets and (b) leveraging workers’ assets.
Leveraging the organization’s assets. When producers lever-
age their own assets, (e.g., a barn or caravan), they drive 
additional revenue by charging their workers for ancillary 
services, typically accommodation, but sometimes meals 
and transportation. Importantly, these charges will often be 
involuntary or hidden for workers, meaning that they need 
bear little resemblance to market rates and quality stan-
dards. Thus, firms—usually those operating in legal indus-
tries, but with little opportunity for value capture because 
of their supply chain context—resort to overcharging work-
ers for sub-par goods and services for which the workers 
have no other options. As one informant, a public-sector 
director explained, “what people tend to do is provide the 
transportation and then charge for the transportation. The 
transportation might not be safe and it might be uneconomi-
cal. You know, an excessive charge” (Director, Govern-
mental Organization, Interview).
However, the way that producers collect revenue from 
ancillary services makes it difficult to disentangle revenue 
generation and cost minimization. For instance, some 
employers will pay workers a legal, albeit minimum wage, 
but make them immediately pay for ancillary services, which 
allows firms to operate within legal boundaries, as this infor-
mant explained:
[I]f you provide accommodation and you charge for it and 
deduct the amount of the charge from the wages, you can breach 
the national minimum wage. If, conversely, you pay the worker 
everything, give them the money, then from that, either on the 
day they get on the bus or at any other point, say to them, “right, 
well you owe us £25 for that,” and the worker hands over £25, 
although it’s the employer that’s running the accommodation 
and providing the work and paying and taking £25, because the 
payment is taken from the worker’s hand, not from the worker’s 
wage packet, it doesn’t breach national minimum wage. 
(Director, Governmental Organization, Interview)
Indeed, some workers might never see any or most of the 
money that they earn due to automatic (and often fraudulent) 
deductions. For example, a union representative recalled that 
they found payslip evidence that migrant workers on a hospi-
tal project were taking home £8.80 ($10.67 USD) a week 
after deductions for accommodation and tools (Representative, 
Trade Union, Interview). With this method, firms essentially 
charge workers to generate revenue that negates or covers a 
large portion of wage costs, creating revenue streams that 
recoup or cancel out wages. Viewed another way, firms are 
repackaging a labor cost reduction to give workers the 
impression that they are making a wage.
Another way that producers generate revenue with ancil-
lary services is via indebtedness or debt bondage. The lever-
aging assets model is most likely to be used where workers 
are already extremely vulnerable; those with little capital or 
existing debts (such as those incurred through recruitment or 
migration) are especially targeted. Workers can be forced 
into debt to the producer in this model when workers do not 
make enough income to pay for ancillary services. This may 
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be because a producer charges excessive prices and/or does 
not offer sufficient wages to pay off costs. We found that this 
form of indebtedness may be leveraged to enable an employer 
to extract more work out of a worker and decrease per unit 
costs, a reminiscence of traditional slavery. Thus, workers 
repay debt through labor and a producer leverages workers, 
as human capital, to generate more units of production.
Charging for ancillary services creates greater potential 
for opacity in the debts accrued by workers, which provides 
increased control for employers (Crane, 2013). To maximize 
returns on ancillary services, producers impose obstacles to 
workers leaving, such as threats, withholding wages, or con-
fiscating documents, as this testimony from a Latvian farmer 
worker in one of our archival sources illustrates:
Oh, they took my passport and after three weeks they did not 
return my passport. I went to ask for it. . .. They always were 
coming up with good excuses. . ., I was trying to get my passport 
back for a year, but they would not return it to me. It was until 
they found out that someone was coming to inspect the farm. 
That same evening they returned passports to all of us. . . .We 
had wanted to leave for some time, but we could not without our 
passports. We realized that it could not be like this, that we work 
hard and do not earn much. We could not go anywhere without 
our passports, but when they returned our passports three of us 
(me and two friends who I met on the farm) we run away from 
the farm. We owed the farmer about £100 for the caravan and 
food. We did not want to work there, so we run away from the 
farm. (Scott et al., 2012, p. 54)
Leveraging workers’ assets. Producers can also generate addi-
tional revenue via new activities that leverage a worker’s 
assets, rights, or privileges. For instance, modern slavery 
enterprises, especially those that are operating illegally or 
informally, sometimes generate revenue via identity and 
benefit theft. Such employers confiscate workers’ identifi-
cation documents, which helps create dependence and con-
trol while restricting freedom of movement. Employers then 
use these documents to make fraudulent benefit and other 
claims, force workers to make claims whether they are enti-
tled to them or not, or sell the documents to generate reve-
nue. Workers typically see little or none of the proceeds 
since any revenue generated is directly captured by employ-
ers. As one report put it:
Victims are brought to the UK with the promise of jobs, have 
benefits registered in their names and are then left destitute, 
without jobs or homes. It is estimated by police that millions of 
pounds are being removed from the UK in the form of benefits 
paid to individuals who do not receive any of the money. 
(Slavery Working Group, 2013, p. 47)
Victims in this model are usually vulnerable workers 
that typically have some status within the relevant welfare 
regime that can be exploited. This includes those who are 
homeless or suffering from mental health or addiction 
problems, or those that (in the case of the United Kingdom) 
are European Union nationals unaware of or unable to exer-
cise their rights.
The asset leveraging model has parallels with traditional 
slavery business models of the Antebellum South as it 
focuses on maximizing value from a fixed set of resources. 
However, whereas most Southern planters focused on 
extracting as much labor from their workers to attain econo-
mies of scale in their usual business (Wilson, 1996), modern 
slavery enterprises engage their workers in a wider range of 
activities that enable the organization to capture value from 
their exploited workers.
Evading Legal Minimums
We now turn to the novel business models of modern slavery 
deployed by labor market intermediaries, which have both 
similarities and differences in comparison to producers. 
Examples of intermediaries that might be engaged in modern 
slavery practices are agencies, recruitment agents, labor pro-
viders, and gangmasters. More specifically, intermediaries 
(whether involved in modern slavery or not) are understood 
as organizations that supposedly create value by conducting 
activities such as finding, selecting, hiring, deploying, train-
ing, firing, or administering workers for producers more effi-
ciently or effectively than they could achieve themselves 
(Bonet et al., 2013).
In the evading legal minimums model, the key driver is 
the intermediary’s need to reduce labor costs just as it is for 
many producers and indeed as it was in traditional slavery. 
However, the involvement of intermediaries as new actors 
actually deploying slavery, rather than just trading the 
enslaved, precipitates new activities and new forms of value 
capture.
Intermediaries have little control over the price charged 
for labor as it is typically dictated by clients. A senior exec-
utive at a recruiting agency suggested that, as a result, cli-
ents help drive unscrupulous agents towards illegality to 
lower costs:
So I put in my unit price for finding these people. . .familiarising 
them, preparing them, getting their visa, transporting them, 
making sure they’ve got decent accommodation, and boarding 
them. And then making sure that, over the two-year assignment, 
they get treated correctly, then taking them back to their home 
country. So, my cost would be $500 to provide you, Mr. 
Customer, with that person. A local agent, [the cost would be] 
between $50 and $100. Guess which bid the customer accepts? 
The agent that is operating illegally. They will not take my cost. 
It is five times higher than somebody else’s because I’m acting 
ethically. (President, Corporation, Interview)
In seeking to reduce labor costs to increase their margins, 
agencies will thus sometimes resort to illegal ways to capture 
value. As an NGO respondent (Interview) noted, “the further 
Crane et al. 13
down the supply chain you go, the lower the profit margins 
are, and therefore the way in which you can maximize your 
profits is by cutting corners.” This pressure on margins trig-
gers intermediaries to respond in creative ways to reduce 
labor costs.
First, some agencies will minimize labor costs by out-
sourcing or subcontracting to other intermediaries. 
Subcontracted intermediaries will typically operate with 
lower labor costs, and these may subsequently outsource to 
other providers, including informal and independent opera-
tors at even lower cost. These more informal or unregulated 
outsourced intermediaries serve as key partners to produc-
ers and intermediaries because they offer the essential 
resource of labor through unique channels, and usually at 
very low cost. While outsourcing does not mean that exploi-
tation will occur, the use of informal and independent oper-
ators creates the conditions where such forms of exploitation 
are more likely thrive (Crane et al., 2019). As an NGO 
informant explained:
In recent history there has often been concerns raised about 
triangular relationships between the worker and the agency and 
employer, but I think that is getting increasingly more 
complicated and I am aware that there can be four, maybe five 
different actors involved in that relationship. That added 
complication certainly facilitates exploitation because it is 
much harder to really understand the terms and conditions that 
somebody’s employed and contracted under. (Manager, NGO, 
Interview)
Informality in labor provision often entails the use of 
vulnerable foreign, migrant, or smuggled workers who 
have already been exploited, deceived, or coerced in forced 
labor arrangements in their home countries, as this infor-
mant explained:
Often these are perfectly ordinary young people who have 
seen an opportunity to get work in the UK who are recruited 
by unscrupulous people in their own country and they get told, 
“Here’s $500,” or whatever it is, “Go to this address in the UK 
and they will give you work.” And then the people arrive, 
having been already hooked into the system and end up in a 
forced labor situation. (Director, Multi-stakeholder Initiative, 
Interview)
A second way that intermediaries will evade legal mini-
mums is through new activities that exploit regulatory loop-
holes to reduce costs. This is more likely to be associated 
with formal intermediaries targeting vulnerable workers, 
often across borders. For example, the use of fraudulent 
self-employment schemes enables workers to be officially 
designated as self-employed, while still effectively con-
trolled by the intermediary. This enables the intermediary to 
bypass regulations regarding pay, working conditions, ben-
efits, and tax obligations to reduce the costs of employment. 
In other cases, intermediaries may employ workers in one 
country with minimal labor standards but deploy them in the 
United Kingdom to avoid UK protections. These intermedi-
aries may “push the law to the absolute limit and often break 
it, but in a way they think they can get away with” (Journalist 
and Consultant, Interview). These activities will not neces-
sarily lead to extreme exploitation, but they do provide the 
conditions under which a business model for modern slav-
ery can be deployed.
In turn, while intermediaries indeed played a key role in 
traditional slavery, the evading legal minimums model repre-
sents a key distinction in how intermediaries have evolved. 
Rather than being restricted to the function of supplying the 
enslaved to enterprises (as was common in traditional slav-
ery), some intermediaries have now assumed the role of slav-
ery enterprises—that is, they are the actors actually deploying 
modern slavery. As such they are engaging in a new set of 
activities that ostensibly create value for producers and other 
intermediaries by offering low-cost labor provision that 
avoids statutory labor standards but at the cost of extreme 
worker exploitation.
Workers as Consumers
Lastly, in a workers as consumers model, rather than just 
earning a margin on the revenue from supplying labor to cli-
ents, the intermediary also generates revenue by providing 
ancillary services such as basic living services including 
accommodation and food, as well as services that are neces-
sary for work such as transportation to and from company 
housing to work sites, or the use of company tools. While 
this has much in common with the asset leveraging model 
used by producers in that it involves the generation of reve-
nue from exploited workers, the business model for interme-
diaries has some key features.
These differences are most evident where intermediaries 
create new linkages between revenue, debt, and labor. 
Intermediaries will use debt to gain control over workers so 
that they can exploit them (Friebel & Guriev, 2006). The sale 
of ancillary services is used both to generate and sustain 
indebtedness, and thus control and obedience, as well as to 
generate revenue, as this informant explained.
I mean, the whole kind of control method is debt, isn’t it? You 
know, from the very start. . .. The whole thing is that the person 
is in debt from the outset because they pay for their travel, they 
pay for any visas, whether they need them or not, they then go 
into the work situation. And there’s two models. One is you can 
never pay back the debt, therefore you need to work. So, one 
model is you always owe so therefore you work and therefore 
you take the exploitative situation because you need to pay back 
and you may never pay back because it may be interest, you may 
move on, you may have add-ons. The other model is you don’t 
get paid. (Director, Consulting Firm, Interview)
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In some cases, this may even give rise to a seemingly 
paradoxical situation of intermediaries deliberately under-
working their forced laborers. In this model, the intermediary 
intentionally takes on more workers than it needs for the 
work it expects to get from its clients. This oversupply leads 
to underemployment for the workers involved, who receive 
perhaps only a few hours or one or two days of work a week. 
Meanwhile, the intermediary will continually charge these 
workers for accommodation and other ancillary services at a 
rate that exceeds their earnings, thus forcing them deeper 
into debt to the intermediary, as described here:
So it’s quite literally people being told well, you come to the 
UK, we’ll lend you the money or if you get here we’ll provide 
you with accommodation and wages, work and then when they 
get here they deliberately don’t give them any work to do. Say, 
look in another two weeks’ time, three weeks’ time we can give 
you work. At the moment, there’s none but don’t worry about it, 
you can stay in the accommodation we provided. There’s a bit of 
money so you don’t starve, pay me back when you start getting 
your wages. So, they sound very nice and reasonable but the 
thing is to build up this bondage so they can’t just walk away. 
(Policy Officer, Trade Union, Interview)
To service this debt, workers may secure outside income 
from family members abroad or instant loan services, which 
enables intermediaries to generate additional revenue. In 
other cases, workers will continue to accumulate large 
amounts of debt, usually with undisclosed premium interest 
rates, that they cannot repay. Consequently, workers are pre-
vented from gaining financial independence and become 
increasingly susceptible to continued exploitation. We label 
this model “workers as consumers” because consumption of 
ancillary services is central to the operation of this approach, 
while in the “asset leveraging” model it is typically just an 
add-on. As a trade union informant suggests, charges for 
ancillary services can be sustained even when workers are 
not being productively deployed, thereby ensuring a con-
stant stream of revenue:
But you get examples where they’re being charged even when 
they’re not being taken to work and the employer will say, yes 
but I’ve had to buy this van. I’m still paying for this van. Just 
because I can’t give your work at this moment, I don’t stop 
paying for this van so you’re going to help me pay for this van. 
(Policy Officer, Trade Union, Interview)
Thus, unlike intermediaries that focus on minimizing the 
unit cost of labor, these intermediaries will be less concerned 
with maximizing its margin charged to clients, and more 
concerned with maximizing the number of workers under its 
control and maximizing the margin earned from services 
supplied to its workers. Therefore, the workers as consumers 
model of modern slavery is probably the most distinct from 
traditional slavery. Rather than over-utilizing workers, 
intermediaries seek to grow their stock of human capital, but 
underutilize workers. Nevertheless, like the other models, 
this model entails considerably hardship and unfreedom for 
workers, who are indebted, subjected to exploitation, and 
face considerable constraints to their freedom of movement.
Discussion
In our findings, we identified and dissected four business 
models of modern slavery that enable enterprises to profit-
ably exploit vulnerable workers but also possess novel dis-
tinctions from the business models of traditional slavery. 
These novel models suggest that both continuities and 
divergences from the business models of traditional slavery 
persist in contemporary society. In this section, we explain 
these continuities and divergences, and explore their impli-
cations for our understanding of the business of modern 
slavery and our understanding of business model innova-
tion more broadly. We conclude by outlining the implica-
tions for policy and practice.
Continuities with Traditional Slavery
In terms of continuities with the business models of tradi-
tional slavery, several key features continue to be manifest in 
modern slavery, and indeed build the foundation of the mod-
ern slavery business models that we identify. Two are par-
ticularly worthy of note: an economic rationale and a reliance 
on coercion.
Economic rationale. Just like traditional slavery (e.g., Fogel & 
Engerman, 1980; Metzer, 1975), modern slavery continues 
to be motivated by an economic rationale, often but not 
exclusively as a way to achieve cost minimization from the 
“cheapness of the labor” (Williams, 1944, p. 19) or com-
pressing labor costs below the legal minimum. As was the 
case with Southern plantations, in modern production firms 
in labor intensive industries, such as construction and agri-
culture, as well among labor intermediaries in most indus-
tries, wages and other labor costs constitute the major driver 
of profitability. These variable costs make up such a large 
proportion of total costs that they are the most viable levers 
for increasing profitability, especially given that most value 
tends to be captured elsewhere in the supply chain. There-
fore, enterprises may look to minimize labor costs through 
modern slavery rather than other forms of innovation to 
undercut competition and maximize profitability (e.g., Miller 
& Smith, 1997), and in doing so, they evade laws and impose 
abusive conditions onto their workforces. However, as we 
show, focusing only on labor costs misses an essential part of 
the picture. It is important not to ignore risk reduction and 
revenue generation that provide an economic underpinning 
for new business models in addition to labor cost minimiza-
tion as we discuss further in relation to divergences.
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Reliance on coercion. Coercion as an enforcement mechanism 
also continues to persist as an essential element sustaining 
slavery business models. This can be achieved through the 
“threat of physical punishment” (Ransom & Sutch, 1977, p. 
20) or physical constraints by an employer on a laborer. 
While the physical shackles of the past have disappeared in 
many contexts, new business models continue to rely on 
threats, fear, and deception to function.
Divergences in the Business Models of Modern 
Slavery
Despite these continuities, there are also important diver-
gences, which can be effectively interpreted as “innovations” 
(albeit oppressive ones) in the business models of modern 
slavery in the form of: new activities, linking activities in 
new ways, and changing which actors perform activities 
(Amit & Zott, 2012)
New activities in modern slavery. One critical change in activi-
ties that enables new business models of modern slavery is a 
shift from upfront purchase of enslaved people to new activi-
ties involved in exercising control over workers. Modern 
slavery largely involves the management of debt-labor con-
tracts, enforced by coercion and threats, rather than capital 
purchases enforced by legal institutions (Crane, 2013). As 
LeBaron (2014, p. 766) puts it, “debt functions as a lever into 
the labor market for those with few alternatives, a form of 
coercion that precludes exit from it, and a form of control 
that allows employers to maximize their exploitation within 
it.” Further, as Bales (2004, p. 25) has argued, this marks a 
shift “away from ownership and fixed asset management, 
concentrating instead on control and use of resources.” Thus, 
whereas a feature of slavery in the Southern plantation was 
the transformation of labor costs from a variable cost to an 
upfront fixed cost (Anderson & Gallman, 1977; Metzer, 
1975), a feature of modern slavery is the shift back to vari-
able costs where laborers might receive some kind of wages 
or remuneration (albeit limited, recouped, or conditional) 
and are under control for shorter periods.
Therefore, the business models of modern slavery often 
include new activities that help to generate value for employ-
ers through worker exploitation in a shorter period. Such 
activities go beyond the traditional model of slaves partici-
pating in production and carrying out domestic services. 
Instead, some employers generate revenue from the assets of 
their workers, while others use their workers to minimize the 
risk of detection of illicit practices. In turn, the business 
models of modern slavery are not just based on minimizing 
labor costs and solving a labor supply problem as is typically 
assumed for traditional slavery, and as much of the modern 
slavery literature would suggest (e.g. Marschke & 
Vandergeest, 2016; Phillips & Mieres, 2014).
Linking activities in new ways in modern slavery. The linking of 
activities in new ways, or what Amit and Zott (2012, p. 44) 
call innovations in the “structure of an activity system,” is 
also present in some of the new business models of modern 
slavery. For example, our research uncovered creative ways 
of integrating employment relationships with consumption 
relationships. In some cases, modern slavery operators take 
advantage of their control over workers to turn them into 
captive “customers” for a range of ancillary services, and 
often charge workers usurious rates for these services. These 
services might vary, but the most common are accommoda-
tion, food, transport, and immigration services. While the 
Figure 2. Traditional and modern slavery business models.
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provision of such services might also be a feature of free 
labor relationships, as well as traditional slavery—Southern 
slave owners provided “the food, shelter and clothing neces-
sary to keep the slaves healthy and hardworking” (Ransom & 
Sutch, 1977, p. 7)—in modern slavery, workers typically 
have little option but to pay for these services and will often 
not know whether or how much they have been charged. The 
innovation here is that employers use a forced labor employ-
ment relationship to acquire a monopolistic position in sup-
plying ancillary services and can charge prices higher than 
market rates. These can be an important and relatively stable 
revenue stream for perpetrators. Charging for these ancillary 
services does not just generate revenue for perpetrators, but 
also enables them to create greater indebtedness (i.e., debt-
bondage) and greater vulnerability. Thus, employment and 
consumption are linked in new ways to create a business 
model of modern slavery more attuned to revenue generation 
than simply labor costs.
There are, of course, parallels here with how consump-
tion, work, and debt are interrelated at the system level. That 
is, as inequality has surged within the contemporary global 
capitalist economy, many households have increased their 
labor market activity (such as by additional family members 
entering the labor force) to maintain consumption levels. 
However, as access to wage labor and decent work is highly 
limited in some contexts, gaining access to jobs domestically 
and abroad often requires taking on debt to intermediaries 
(LeBaron, 2020). For instance, one recent study estimates 
that migrant workers around the world pay US$10–20 billion 
a year in recruitment fees, and considerable portions of those 
fees are paid for through debt (Martin, 2017). Debt is becom-
ing an increasingly common strategy to maintain class status 
and consumption levels across the skilled and “unskilled” 
ends of the labor market, and across the global North and 
South (Graeber, 2011; Soederberg, 2014). However, while 
debt functions as a mechanism of labor market control and 
discipline for large swathes of the labor market, it renders 
workers at the bottom end of the labor market particularly 
vulnerable to forced labor, due to the lack of alternative 
means to obtain their subsistence (LeBaron, 2014).
New actors in modern slavery. Plantation owners were the 
key actors deploying the enslaved in traditional slavery—
they forced people to work and made enslaved labor a key 
resource in the operation of their businesses. In some mod-
ern slavery businesses, plantation owners have been 
replaced by other broadly similar producers, such as farm-
ers, factory owners, or mine operators (Bales, 2004). A key 
difference, though, is that producers and those they exploit 
are not necessarily divided by race, or even at times nation-
ality, as they were in the Antebellum South. However, racial 
discrimination does remain a key determinant of exploita-
tion—albeit very much along with other markers of dis-
crimination, such as gender, ethnicity, caste, and various 
other social categorizations that are used to create and jus-
tify exploitation (LeBaron et al., 2018). Therefore, although 
the form of discrimination may have changed, it is “rooted 
in the very same logics” as the slavery of the Antebellum 
South (LeBaron et al., 2018).
In addition, other actors need also to be considered, which 
has tended to be overlooked in existing accounts of modern 
slavery, where “employers” are often represented in quite 
homogenous terms. The main development here is that in 
contrast to the Antebellum South, labor market intermediar-
ies also play a key role deploying modern slavery and so it is 
the business models of intermediaries that need also to be 
addressed.4 These individuals or organizations, who are 
players in business value chains or activity systems (Amit & 
Zott, 2012), “mediate between individual workers and the 
organizations that need work done, shaping how workers are 
matched to organizations, how tasks are performed, and how 
conflicts are resolved” (Bonet et al., 2013, p. 341). So, inter-
mediaries are not directly engaged in production, but provide 
the key resources of labor and labor-related services to pro-
ducers, making them essential partners in producers’ own 
business models (Osterwalder & Pigneur 2010).
While much traditional slavery relied on a process of 
recruitment, movement, and deployment where slaveholders 
were typically distinct from slave traders (Baptist, 2014), 
many intermediaries are now not only traders but also play a 
much more active role in deploying and extracting value 
from enslaved people, often unbeknownst to producers 
themselves. Therefore, while we tend to think of intermedi-
aries as being middlemen between producers and those 
enslaved, involved principally in trade, they now often retain 
a relationship with forced laborers, and may indeed be the 
actor exercising control over them. This is part of a broader 
shift from a dyadic employment relationship between 
employer and worker to a triangular relationship where 
employer roles and responsibilities may be blurred across 
different actors (Bonet et al., 2013; Davidov, 2004; Vosko, 
1997). In the context of modern slavery, we demonstrate that 
distinct business models have arisen for producers and inter-
mediaries in deploying forced labor. Although intermediaries 
were clearly present in traditional slavery, their involvement 
in the business models of modern slavery clearly represents 
a new actor role with associated new activities and activity 
linkages.
Implications for Research
Our analysis has important implications for research on the 
business of modern slavery and on business models more 
broadly.
Business of modern slavery. Our study has implications for the 
business of modern slavery literature. First, as stated earlier, 
this literature tends to only touch lightly upon the mechanics 
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of how businesses actually operate. In the portion of this lit-
erature anchored in development studies and political econ-
omy (Barrientos et al., 2013; Phillips, 2013), there is often an 
overwhelming focus on the role of big brand and multi-
national companies like Nike or Walmart in shaping the con-
ditions for labor standards within global supply chains. 
While the role of such companies is no doubt important, 
especially in creating the conditions for the emergence of the 
business models we identify here, the focus on the top of the 
supply chain has meant that the sub-tiers of production, 
where modern slavery actually tends to thrive, has been 
understudied. Our research highlights the importance of 
understanding the businesses at the bottom of such supply 
chains, and especially in pinpointing the value of modern 
slavery to their operations and how they profit from it.
Clearly the business models of multinationals and the 
business models of modern slavery enterprises that we focus 
on here are not unrelated. When a multinational shifts its 
business model to seek the highest flexibility and lowest pos-
sible cost through outsourcing, for example, this can set in 
train a drive to increase flexibility and reduce cost through-
out the supply chain. As a result, modern slavery enterprises 
may emerge to help facilitate this, and they in turn may need 
to adapt their business models—to generate revenue or 
reduce costs—in order to succeed in doing so. Therefore, the 
business models we have identified can also at times be part 
of broader business models of multinationals, and indeed can 
be a key aspect in making them feasible.
We illustrate this in Figure 2 where we summarize the 
continuity and divergence in traditional and modern slavery 
business models, and illustrate some of the economic and 
legal forces that shape these business models.
What this means is that the business models we identify—
as with the business models of traditional slavery—do not 
appear out of a vacuum, or simply as a result of individual 
criminal intent, but are embedded within a broader capitalist 
global economy that makes their emergence somewhat pre-
dictable (see LeBaron et al 2018 for an overview and typol-
ogy of how capitalism gives rise to both a supply of vulnerable 
workers and business demand for forced labor). As Banerjee 
(2021, p.415) argues,
[S]lavery is an abhorrent practice and while it is technically a 
crime under international law, it is important to realize that it 
remains a viable and profitable management practice for 
business. Modern slavery, far from being an aberration, is a 
logical outcome of the way our political economic system is 
organized and its historical origins in the colonial enterprise.
 
Indeed, evidence suggests that most identified cases of 
modern slavery demonstrate connections—either through 
economic or social ties—to a range of legitimate businesses 
(De Vries, 2019).
In Figure 2, we show that global economy forces such as 
the legal context, global supply chains, and consumer 
demand help to explain why both the business models of tra-
ditional slavery enterprises were sustained and then dis-
rupted, and why innovation in business models has been 
prompted in modern slavery enterprises. These are clearly 
not the only such forces that are relevant, but we include 
them for illustrative purposes of the more general point. 
Specifically, the legal context helped sustain earlier business 
models by establishing the legality of slavery but then the 
forces of abolition severely disrupted these models from the 
19th century onwards. Likewise, for modern slavery, illegal-
ity coupled with poor enforcement has been a major influ-
ence on the type of business models that have emerged. 
Similarly, just as the global slave trade and the demand for 
commodities from international trading companies sustained 
traditional slavery business models, so too do the business 
models of present-day multinationals prompt innovations in 
modern slavery business models. Consumer demand, mean-
while, played an important role in disrupting traditional slav-
ery business models in the form of boycotts, while current 
consumers seem unwilling or unable to effect similar change 
in modern slavery business models (Smith & Johns, 2019). 
We will return to these forces in our discussion of implica-
tions for policy and practice below.
It is also evident, however, that not all modern slavery 
enterprises are embedded in the supply chains of multina-
tionals, or subject to the demands of consumers in the global 
North. The business models we identified that are least likely 
to be such—the illegal markets variant of the risk reduction 
model and the workers’ assets variant of the asset leveraging 
model—demonstrate that evolutions in the business models 
of modern slavery can also occur among informal and illegal 
enterprises whose products and workers do not end up in 
large companies. This highlights the importance of identify-
ing how modern slavery enterprises make money and why 
they resort to such practices as part of a business model 
because the profit imperative is present irrespective of the 
degree of formality of legality of the business—even though 
the practices and contexts may vary. In illuminating these 
variations of modern slavery enterprises, we broaden the dis-
cussion in the literature to discuss a broader range of busi-
ness settings linked to modern slavery.
In the popular literature on modern slavery (Bales, 2004; 
Bowe, 2007; Kara 2009), the business of modern slavery 
tends to be presented in a homogenous and overly simplistic 
way. Our research contradicts some of the literature’s charac-
terizations of the business of modern slavery, such as that 
victims are unpaid. For example, Kara (2009, p. 11) defines 
modern slavery in the sex industry as “the violent coercion of 
unpaid sex services”. It also shows that there is significant 
variation in the role that modern slavery plays within a busi-
ness model, and how a business tends to create and capture 
value through slavery. These variations have not been recog-
nized in the modern slavery literature, where businesses have 
tended to be studied in highly superficial ways and where 
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scholars tend to assume that modern slavery occurs randomly 
within the economy, and it is thus not possible to systemati-
cally map and understand associated business models.
Business models. Our study offers new insights into the dark 
side of business models and their evolution over time. 
Although research has increasingly focused on how new 
business models can benefit the environment and society 
(Massa et al., 2017), there is scant research focused on 
understanding how changes in business models can explic-
itly harm individuals or society (Martí, 2018). However, 
with growing attention to the potential negative effects of 
business models in the digital, sharing, and gig economies 
(e.g. Friedman, 2014; Todolí-Signes, 2017), our study seeks 
to make new connections between the business model lit-
erature and research on the broader pathologies and social 
harms of contemporary organizational practice (Linstead 
et al., 2014).
Critics of businesses involved in slavery as well as other 
less extreme forms of worker exploitation, including those in 
the gig economy, tend to blame “the business model”. For 
instance, Aloisi (2016) examines the “the underlying busi-
ness model” (p. 64) of the sharing economy through case 
studies such as Uber and Amazon Mechanical Turk to show 
how it exploits and reproduces precarious employment. 
Likewise, Ewart-James and Wilkins (2015) associate the 
exploitation of migrants in the hospitality industry with the 
“low cost/low value business model” adopted by the indus-
try. More broadly, companies as diverse as Apple (Lehman & 
Haslam, 2013) and Walmart (Sethi, 2014) have seen their 
core business model identified as the cause of worker exploi-
tation and other social ills.
While such studies have provided valuable insights on 
exploitative business models at both firm and industry levels, 
they have tended to ignore smaller firms at the bottom of the 
supply chain, and how their business models have evolved 
and adapted to these broader changes. Moreover, their focus 
on a specific, single business model suggests there is a single 
underlying rationale for how organizations create and cap-
ture value that leads to negative social outcomes. Our study 
demonstrates that an analysis of oppressive business model 
changes can unpack these assumptions and contribute new 
insight into the diversity of such models and how, in distinct 
ways, the new actors, activities, and linking of activities that 
constitute them give rise to different manifestations of 
exploitation and social harm.
Implications for Policy and Practice
Our analysis also has important implications for policy and 
practice, particularly as it pertains to detecting and remedy-
ing modern slavery in the United Kingdom, and in the global 
economy more broadly. We believe that confronting the 
business models of modern slavery can and should play a 
critical role in helping to reduce the incidence of extreme 
exploitation, and in developing less exploitative ways of 
doing business.
Policy implications. At present, in most jurisdictions, there 
are sparse resources for labor enforcement, inspection of 
workplaces is minimal, and policing of extreme forms of 
exploitation is hampered by problems of detection of crimes 
and of identification of victims and perpetrators (Crane 
et al., 2019). This creates a context wherein business models 
configured around modern slavery can be enacted with 
widespread impunity, in spite of the fact that forced labor is 
a crime. Our findings can be used for law enforcement by 
profiling different forms of perpetrators based on their busi-
ness models, thereby enabling “follow-the-money” type 
crime control strategies (see Naylor, 2003). Specifically, 
returning to Table 2, there are particular victims and perpe-
trators that are more likely to be associated with particular 
modern slavery business models, which can enable enhanced 
profiling and better focusing of law enforcement resources. 
For example, law enforcement agencies targeting labor 
intermediaries involved in modern slavery might choose to 
concentrate on those operating the workers as consumers 
models—and therefore their attention should focus on 
investigating deductions from migrant workers’ wages as an 
initial starting point to “follow-the-money.”
In addition, understanding the business models of mod-
ern slavery can help in devising better forms of business 
regulation, licensing, and taxation that might create addi-
tional economic disincentives for perpetrators. The chal-
lenge here is to find ways that would disrupt existing 
business models. For example, one potential pathway for 
new regulation could be the requirement for additional 
licensing requirements for organizations seeking to provide 
accommodation or transport services. Providing such licens-
ing was adequately enforced, this could help in preventing 
some enterprises from perpetrating modern slavery by mak-
ing it more difficult to operate either a workers as consum-
ers model for intermediaries or an asset leveraging model 
for producers. Another potential pathway could be new legal 
requirements for landlords to conduct regular property 
inspections. Such an intervention could significantly shift 
the risk calculus of criminals thinking of using forced labor 
in cannabis production. That is, if cannabis producers knew 
that landlords were compelled to inspect their properties, the 
economic benefits of using forced labor to prevent detection 
might be reduced sufficiently.
Relatedly, although current approaches to tackling mod-
ern slavery are hampered by assumptions that it is a hidden 
crime, our research suggests that it is possible to pinpoint 
common characteristics of organizations that use modern 
slavery, and thereby target policy and policing interven-
tions, as well as victim support systems, accordingly. 
Potential indicators of modern slavery suggested by our 
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analysis would include the following: (a) high levels of 
labor intermediation in the context of low wage jobs on or 
around the minimum wage; (b) low levels of value capture 
at specific levels of the value chain (thereby precipitating 
the cutting of corners or provision of additional revenue 
generating activities); (c) workers required to purchase 
high priced ancillary services; and (d) more common indi-
cators such as passport and other identity document reten-
tion. With the proliferation of policy and legislation 
targeting modern slavery and related human rights issues in 
supply chains, such insight can help policy-makers better 
develop and revise their efforts to remedy modern slavery.
Ultimately, our research also highlights the importance 
of social protection for low-wage and migrant workers, and 
for ensuring robust forms of labor law enforcement that pre-
vent businesses from compressing labor costs below mini-
mum wage. At present, modern slavery legislation is 
primarily focused on increasing transparency in the supply 
chains of large companies. However, this approach has a 
number of in-built structural limitations for dealing with the 
modern slavery business models identified in our study. 
First, some of these enterprises do not even operate in the 
supply chains of large companies and so will be overlooked 
by the legislation. Second, the legislation is based on an as 
yet untested assumption that final consumers will actually 
act on information about slavery in supply chains—even if 
it were reliably and accurately provided. As Smith and Johns 
(2019) argue, moral indifference may be a better explana-
tion for a lack of consumer action on the issue of modern 
slavery than ignorance alone. This is supported by research 
from Carrington et al (2018, p. 14) who found that rather 
than acting on their concerns about exploitative practices, 
“more commonly, consumers came up with a series of justi-
fications or neutralizations that allowed them to remove any 
sense of personal guilt or responsibility in relation to mod-
ern slavery.” Hence, although consumers were effective in 
disrupting the business models of traditional slavery, in the 
context of modern slavery, regulators would be better 
advised to directly protect workers in exploitative situations 
rather than trusting that market mechanisms will work 
through the power of consumer activism.
Practitioner implications. For business practitioners, our find-
ings also provide new insight on how to protect their own 
businesses from the taint of slavery or how to address the 
competitive threats posed by competitors using modern slav-
ery to undercut them. Regarding the former, as suggested 
earlier, our analysis helps identify new risk factors that are 
likely to be associated with modern slavery enterprises that 
might be in companies’ supply chains. These include inter-
mediaries that have additional revenue streams or the use of 
workers with unsustainable consumption relationships with 
their employers. These risk factors can potentially be identi-
fied by companies through more sophisticated social 
accountability processes such as worker voice mechanisms 
(Gunawardana, 2014) that can then prompt appropriate inter-
ventions. Again, by identifying in our analysis which work-
ers are likely to be vulnerable to which business models, 
companies can more effectively identify potential victims 
and determine what information they might prioritize in col-
lecting from and about them.
We also provide a platform for more accurately identifying 
why and how modern slavery enterprises in a firm’s supply 
chain engage in extreme exploitation as a way of sustaining 
their businesses. This can be used by firms to better identify 
where in their supply chain they should target social responsi-
bility initiatives aimed at tackling modern slavery. In particu-
lar, companies should consider going beyond simply auditing 
working conditions to developing initiatives that are designed 
to enhance the value available to suppliers most at risk of 
crossing the line into extreme exploitation. As we show in 
Figure 2, the business models of slavery enterprises are 
shaped at least in part by the business models of corporate 
actors forcing low prices through the supply chain in order to 
enhance their own value capture. As a result, there is a case to 
be made that brands may be complicit in many of these 
instances of business model innovation by modern slavery 
enterprises. It is only by reducing the pressure on such suppli-
ers and ensuring that there is more equitable distribution of 
value through the supply chain that the business models we 
identify can be effectively confronted by corporations.
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Notes
1. While slavery was made illegal in much of the world during 
the 19th century, legislation to prohibit specific forms of slav-
ery such as bonded labor were typically instituted much later. 
For example, legislation addressing bonded labor was intro-
duced in India in 1976, in Pakistan in 1992, and in Nepal in 
2000 (see Quirk 2008).
2. Most notable here has been Kara’s (2009, 2017) work. Such 
work has been critiqued several times in the academic literature 
20 Journal of Management Inquiry 00(0)
(e.g., Agustín, 2012; Andersson et al., 2019).
3. See the ILO Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29), avail-
able at https://bit.ly/2kvyezD
4. Labor market intermediaries have also earlier played more 
direct roles in manifestations of slavery after abolition, includ-
ing for example the padrones who exploited immigrant work-
ers in North America in the late 1880s and early 1900s, see 
Peck (2000).
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